Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 13 | Issue 1

Article 4

11-1-1937

Contributors to the November Issue/Notes
John De Mots
Joseph B. Shapero
William Langley
Rex E. Weaver

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
John De Mots, Joseph B. Shapero, William Langley & Rex E. Weaver, Contributors to the November Issue/Notes, 13 Notre Dame L. Rev.
54 (1937).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol13/iss1/4

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.

CONTRIBUTORS TO THE NOVEMBER ISSUE
WILLIAM MORLEY CAIN, LL. B., University of Nebraska, 1894.
Practiced in Nebraska from 1894 to 1929; County Attorney, David
City, Nebraska, 1897 to 1901; City Attorney, Fremont, Nebraska,
1919 and 1920; member of the Nebraska Supreme Court Commission,
1920 and 1921. Author of: Delays in Administration of Justice, Central
Law Journal; Extension of Equity Jurisdiction,6 Notre Dame Lawyer
141; Delay in the Administration of Justice, 7 Notre Dame Lawyer
284; How the Criminal Escapes the Law and How to Stop Him, 8
Notre Dame Lawyer 269.
WALTER BURGWYN JONES, LL. B., University of Alabama, 1909.
Member, Bar of the Supreme Court of the United States, American
Bar Association and Alabama Bar; Member, House Judiciary Committee, Legislature of Alabama, 1919; Vice-President, Board of City Commissioners of Montgomery, 1919-20; Member, Alabama State Highway
Commission, 1919; President, Board of Jury Supervisors Montgomery
County, Alabama, 1923 to date. Presiding Judge, Fifteenth Judicial
Circuit of Alabama; President and Founder of the Jones University,
Montgomery (formerly Jones Law School).
CLARENCE J. RUDDY, LL. B., 1927, University of Notre Dame.
Author of: Compulsory Sterilization: An Unwarranted Extension of
the Powers of Government, 3 Notre Dame Lawyer 1; Dangerous Optimism, 2 Notre Dame Lawyer 95; Defender of Ignorance, 2 Notre
Dame Lawyer 163; The Fallacy of Progress in Politics, 2 Notre Dame
Lawyer 206; The Futility of Prejudice, 2 Notre Dame Lawyer 20;
Hypocrisy-A By-Product of Paternalism, 4 Notre Dame Lawyer 374;
James Fenimore Cooper and His Critics, 2 Notre Dame Lawyer 13;
Lawyers and the Flowing Bowl, 5 Notre Dame Lawyer 3; The Misunderstood Burr: His Duel With Hamilton, 2 Notre Dame Lawyer 95.
First Editor of The Notre Dame Lawyer. Practicing law at Aurora,
Illinois.

NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - MINIMUM WAGE LEGISLATION. - In this
field of constitutional law which today has advanced to one of the-greatest importance to the people of this country, three leading cases have
become the guiding lights for discussion. The first of these passed upon
the power of Congress to regulate minimum wages for women in the
District of Columbia and was considered by the United States Su-
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preme Court in Adkins v. Children's Hospital.' After much study of
this decision by the proponents of the law, the Legislature of New
York passed a minimum wage law, which was tested in the second of
the three "beacon light" cases, Morekead v. People of New York. 2
In both of these decisions the sponsors of the idea of minimum wage
were disheartened by decrees of unconstitutionality. However, in the
latest of these basic cases, the Washington's minimum wage law, which
was not unlike the New York Law, was declared constitutional. 3
There was a strong dissenting opinion in each instance.
Before tracing the reasoning through which the same idea was finally
considered by the highest court of the land to be within the confines
of the Federal Constitution, a brief sketch of the history of these laws
finds as early as 1912 such a statute was passed in Massachusetts. Concerning this law, which was purely directory in form, it is of importance
to note that the highest court of that State sustained the statute, and,
since then, has gone uncontested. However, an early Oregon law, mandatory in form, was declared unconstitational in Stettler v. O'Hara.4 In
the statute books of many states can be found such a law as this which
has never been enforced or repealed because of this decision.
It was in 1923 that the Congressional Aot, an ordinance for the city
of Washington, was considered, as to its constitutionality, in the Adkins case. The Fifth Amendment of the Federal Constitution provides,
in part, that no person "shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor shall property be taken for public use
without just compensation." The basis of this Congressional Act was
that the police power granted to Congress the power to maintain the
health and morals of these women and that the only manner in which
this was possible was the maintenance of a living wage upon which
to exist. The attempt to place this ordinance within the "health doctrine" was refused by the Supreme Court in a five-to-three decision
(Judge Brandeis not sitting). The law provided that a commission
formed by authority of this Act could make regulations as to the
amount of minimum wages to be paid and if this recommendation were
violated, the unlawful act would be duly considered and a punishment
placed on the wrongdoer. In sustaining the view that the freedom of
contract had been set out by an ever-increasing line of decisions the
court stated that "the right to contract about one's affairs is a part
of the liberty of the individual protected by this clause [due process
clause] is settled by the decisions of this court and is no longer open
to question." The police power to protect health was declared to be of
no importance in respect to the supervening right of protection of the
liberty of contract.
1 261 U. S. 525 (1922).

2 56 S. Ct. 918, 80 L. Ed. 1347 (1935).
3 West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 57 S. Ct. 578, 81 L. Ed. 455 (1937).

4

139 Pac. 743 (Ore. 1914).
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In answer to the ethical argument briefed by the counsels for the
state, that a woman must be paid sufficiently to maintain her health,
morals, and general welfare, the court states that there is a stronger
ethical argument and requisite understood between the parties to the
employment contract, namely, that the amount to be paid by the employer and the work to be rendered by the employee must have a relation of equivalence to one another. This was completely ignored by
those proponents of this ordinance.
Consider now for a moment the Morekead case, which declared unconstitutional the statute of the state of New York, that set a minimum
wage for women and minors. In this Statute the Legislature not only
attempted to base the theory of the law on the necessity to maintain
the women's health and morals but also upon the idea of "fair wages."
This latter idea was much more predominate in the argument of counsels which endeavored to differentiate this law from the Congressional
Ordinance for the District of Columbia. The court, in refusing to accept this difference, pointed out in the Morekead case that the same
freedom of contract had been violated. Just as the Fifth Amendment
forbids Congress to impair "life, liberty, or property, without due process of law," so, also, does the Fourteenth Amendment forbid the states
to do so. Much weight was given in the discussion to the reasoning that
the ability to determine a fair wage was given a commission. Just what
is a fair wage? Is this not legislative power delegated to that branch of
the government and not to a body appointed by the governor? In answering the defense's theory of argument that there is a difference between the living wage as set out in the Adkins case and the fair wage
of the New York Law, the United States Supreme Court quotes from
the opinion of the New York Court of Appeals in Morehead v. People
of New York: "'The minimum wage must include both. What was
vague before has not been made clearer. One of the elements therefore
in fixing the fair wage is the very matter which was the basis of the
congressional act.'" The United States Supreme Court does not consider the factual viewpoint of this statement but merely suggests that
it is not within the province of the highest court of the land to interpret a state law but it must be accepted as though it had been specifically set out in the act.5 Those framing the New York rule obviously
thought it sufficient to avoid the error made in the constitutional basis
of the Washington Ordinance to designate "fair wages" for it was in this
that the argument for ethics had more support. No statement to the
effect that there must be an equality between the wages paid and
work expended by the employee could now be used. The ethical argument would seem to be more forceful, but the court decreed that
5 Supreme Lodge of K. P. v. Meyer, 265 U. S. 30, 32 (1924).
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there was no difference between a group of people fixing a fair wage
and a minimum wage.
Noticing that neither the "health doctrine" based on police power,
or the "fair wage doctrine" could be maintained, the attorneys acting
for the State of Washington in presenting that case, testing their
minimum wage law, based their argument upon the theory of the inequality of the parties to the contract. The economic basis of this has
long been recognized. There is a certainty that the employer can state
his demands and ask for long hours and low wages, but on the other
hand the laborer, competing against a supply of labor which far exceeds the demand for it, must either comply with the employer's terms
or not work. Is this, then, with things under such conditions, freedom
of contract? It is contended that this inequality precipitates the necessity for the entrance of the police power into this field to protect the
welfare of the nation. It is a philosophical principle that the component parts make up the whole and therefore there must be protection
for each member of society to maintain the general welfare and common defense of the state. It is a legislative prerogative to determine
whether the police power is an essential for the protection of the welfare
of the people. Some criticism of the law, which was claimed had not
an iota of constitutional basis, was the fact that men were excluded
from .the protection of the law. The answer of the court is that the
Statute is "not unconstitutional notwithstanding it did not extend to
men, since legislative authority acting within its proper field is not
bound to extend its regulation to all cases which it might possibly
reach," but can restrict itself to those evils which are clearest, it should
not be overthrown because it does not seek out those people not so obviously oppressed.
An apparently abrupt reversal of a former ruling appears in the
West Coast Hotel case. However, for years such rules have been achieving precedence by decisions of the court which have overthrown the
theory of absolute freedom of contract. Even in the opinion in the
Adkins case it is said that "there is, of course, no such thing as absolute
freedom of contract. It is.subject to a variety of restraints. But freedom of contract is nevertheless the general rule, and restraint the exception; and the exercise of legislative authority to abridge it can be
justified only by existence of exceptional circumstances." The law has
regulated public utilities; the peculiar nature of the business and its
close relation to the public furnishes the basis for the precedent that
these utilities' contracts can be controlled. 6 Munn v. Illinois 7 opens
6 Ohio Bell Telephone v. Public Utilities Commission, 131 Ohio St. 539, 3
N. E. (2d) 475 (1936).
7 94 U. S. 113 (1877).
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an even broader field which considered that although the elevator business is not a public utility, yet it is so cloaked with a public interest
that the storage rates can be regulated. So also are such things as regulation for the size of bread,8 lard containers, 9 insurance rates, 10 and
even regulation of hours. 11
A definite new trend to judicial interpretation has been set out in
the Washington minimum wage law case. Previously, the fundamental
right of "liberty" was interpreted to give persons the right of freedom
of contract. However, the historical idea of -liberty as set out in the
Magna Carta, and that which was in the minds of the writers of the
Federal Constitution, comes into the foreground in the statement that
"in prohibiting that deprivation, the Constitution does not recognize an
absolute and uncontrollable liberty. Liberty in each of its phases has
its history and connotation. But the liberty safeguarded is liberty in
a social organization which requires the protection of law against the
evils which menace the health, safety, morals, and welfare of the people." 12 In this opinion, therefore, we see the recognition of the fact that
the only true liberty is that which is, in a sense, guarded and restricted.
When the Federal Constitution was framed certain restrictions were
placed on the states in the various articles, and before it was ever
presented for adoption, restrictions, even though understood to be in
existence on the Federal Government- being an organization of granted powers - were reiterated in the Bill of Rights. Do these restrictions
exist upon any other legislative body in the world, or upon any other
government? Not in the least, yet, who is to deny that the greatest
liberty upon this earth exists in this country. Other governments, confined to no constitution, impose on their subjects such rules that their
liberty is questioned. In a like manner certain curbs upon the liberty
to contract were certainly intended in the penning of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. Without restrictions interpreted here, there
would be no freedom of contract.
Conservative Associate Justice Fields, in his dissenting opinion in
the Munn case, considers piecemeal the due process clause of the Federal Constitution. Justice Fields asserts: "By the term 'life,' as here
used, something more is meant than mere animal existence. The inhibition against its deprivation extends to all those limbs and faculties
by which life is enjoyed. The provision equally prohibits the mutilation
of the body by the amputation of an arm or leg, or the putting out of
an eye, or the destruction of any other organ of the body through
which the soul communicates with the outer world. The deprivation not
only of life, but of whatever God has given to every one with life, for
8 Schmidinger v. Chicago, 226 U. S. 578 (1913).
9 Armour & Co. v. North Dakota, 240 U. S. 510 (1916).

10

11
12

O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 282 U.-S. 251 (1931)Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U. S. 207 (1904).

West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, op. cit. supra note 2, at 581.
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its growth and enjoyment, is prohibited by the provision in question,
if its efficacy be not frittered away by judicial decision." The majority
opinion in MacMullen v. City of Middletown,13 citing the opinion of
Justice Fields, sustains this idea and adds that not only does the due
process clause refer to judicial proceedings but also to administrative
and executive phases of government. These observations substantiate
the argument for the necessity for a minimum wage based on the police
power because good health is an absolute requisite for life. A normal
life must be considered only in the light of everyday existence and to
make this more than an animal's existence, a "fair wage" must be
granted. Never has the constitutionality of a living wage been upheld
on this idea; but God, who gave us "life," provided a certain amount
of the earth's bounties for all mankind, and in an attempt to distribute
this more evenly the government's laws on minimum wages could accordingly be held constitutional. For this reason we see that not only
is there liberty in curtailing freedom of contract, but also enforcement
of a provision of the Constitution, that is to provide for a normal life.
Both of these ideas have as an essential off-spring, the power to declare a minimum wage. Therefore past decisions have enabled the
proponents of the minimum wage law to find one that has been declared effective according to the Constitution by showing that the police
power to protect health and general welfare of the women has reached
all fields cloaked with a public interest, and also that further provisions
to aid labor - which are sure to be presented before the forthcoming
Special Session of Congress is well under way-can be upheld on the
theory that to maintain freedom of contract certain restrictions must
be placed on the contracting parties, and lastly, on the constitutional
guarantee to protect the people so they may live a normal life.
John De Mots.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-THE PROPOSED CHILD LABOR AMENDMENT.

-Should the proposed Child Labor Amendment be accepted? For almost fourteen years this question has been argued prQ and con by
eminent authorities. The Amendment was proposed in 1924, and up
to June 1, 1937, only twenty-eight states had ratified the Amendment.
It is very improbable that the necessary remaining eight states will
ratify it in the near future in spite of a plea on January 8, 1937, by
President Roosevelt, in which, in personal letters to the governors of
all those states still rejecting the proposed Amendment, the President
urged its adoption.
Why was such an amendment ever proposed? Why do some so
vigorously oppose it? In the light of recent Congressional legislation,
18

98 N. Y. S. 145, 150 (1906).
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and still more recent Supreme Court interpretations, is such an amendment still necessary to accomplish the desired purpose? These are the
questions we will attempt to answer in the following composition. The
text of the 1924 proposed Child Labor Amendment is as follows:
"Section 1. The Congress shall have power to limit, regulate, and
prohibit the labor of persons under eighteen years of age.
"Section 2. The power of the several states is unimpaired by this
article except that the operation of state laws shall be suspended to
the extent necessary to give effect to legislation enacted by the Congress."
Let us consider the above mentioned questions in the order in which
they were presented. First, why was such an amendment ever proposed? It would seem quite superfluous here to deal with the social and
economic aspects of this question. I believe we all agree on these. Suffice it to say that it is highly desirable, in such a civilized world as we
are supposed to be living in now, to keep our children in school and in
childly pursuits during their immature years, rather than having them
confined in industry which will often endanger their future health and
happiness. The legal circumstances which necessitated the proposed
Amendment interests us much more.
In the early years of the twentieth century there was much propaganda against the hire of children in industry. The Congress of the
United States realized the evil of this practice, and under its right
granted in the Constitution of the United States, to regulate interstate and foreign commerce, -the Congress passed the Act of September
1, 1916, which intended to prevent interstate commerce in the products
of child labor. The constitutionality of this Act of Congress came before the United States Supreme Court in 1918, in the case of Hammer
v. Dagenhart.1 The first and material section of the Act is as follaws:
"That no producer, manufacturer, or dealer shall ship or deliver for
shipment in interstate or foreign commerce any article or commodity
the product of any mine or quarry, situated in the United States, in
which within thirty days prior to the time of the removal of such product therefrom children under the age of sixteen years have been employed or permitted to work, or any article or commodity the product
of any mill, cannery, workshop, factory, or manufacturing establishment, situated in the United States, in which within thirty days prior
to the removal of such product therefrom children under the age of
fourteen years have been employed or permitted to work, or children
between the ages of fourteen years and sixteen years have been employed or permitted to work more than eight hours in any day, or more
than six days in any week, or after the hour of seven o'clock postmeridian, or before the hour of six o'clock antemeridian." In a five-to1 247 U. S. 251 (1918).
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four decision, by a sharply divided court, the Act of 1916 was held to
be unconstitutional. Knowing that Congress was seeking to regulate
child labor through the power given to it in the Constitution to regulate interstate and foreign commerce, the majority of the court .said:
"The Act in its effect does not regulate transportation among the
states, but aims to standardize the ages at which children may be employed in mining and manufacturing within the states. The goods
shipped are of themselves harmless .... When offered for shipment,
and before transportation begins, the labor of their production is over,
and the mere fact that they were intended for interstate commerce
transportation does not make their production subject to federal control under the commerce clause." Thus Congress was denied the right
to regulate child labor. This problem was declared to be one of those
powers which the states reserved for themselves, and if Congress was
to ever obtain this power it would have to be through a constitutional
amendment. Such an amendment was the one proposed to the states
in 1924. We will not question the wisdom of the majority opinion in
the Hammer case. But let us remember that it was a five-to-four decision and that the very vigorous dissent was led by the late Mr.
Justice Holmes and by Mr. Justice Brandeis. We would not speculate
as to how the present day Supreme Court would rule if a similar question is ever brought before it. The Supreme Court has overruled itself before. We must mention in passing, however, that the Supreme
Court has upheld the right of Congress to prohibit from interstate
commerce stolen motor vehicles, 2 lottery tickets, 3 products owned by
the carriers carrying them, 4 adulterated and misbranded articles, 5 women for immoral purposes,0 and kidnaped persons.7 Perhaps if the
question of the Hammer case was ever revived the minority contention
in this case would be adopted, in the light of all these later opinions.
Let us now see why the proposed Child Labor Amendment, after
over thirteen years, is still unratified. Why do some so vigorously op.
pose it? We only have to read it over carefully to see what might be
wrong. Its provisions are far too sweeping and general in their effect.
Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler, Chairman of the New York State Committee Opposing Ratification, called the proposal the "Youth Control
Amendment." Its purpose and effect would be to put some 42,000,000
of the nation's population, being all those less than eighteen years of
age, under the direct control of Congress, thus depriving the home,
Brooks v. United States, 267 U. S. 432 (1925).
8 Champion v. Ames, 188 U. S. 321 (1903).
4 United States v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U. S. 366 (1909).
5 United States v. Sixty-five Casks Liquid Extracts, 170 Fed. 449 (D. C.
N. D. W. Va. 1909), affirmed, United States v. Knowlton Danderine Co., 175
Fed. 1022 (C. C. A. 4th, 1910).
6 Wilson v. United States, 232 U. S. 563 (1913).
7 Gooch v. United States, 297 U. S. 124 (1936).
2
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the school, and the church of the protection they have always enjoyed under American tradition and principles and place them at the
mercy of Congress. The Catholic Church has opposed the proposed
Amendment, rightly claiming it would empower Congress to interfere
with parochial schools. The only wish and desire, even of the staunchest reformers, is to prohibit child labor, which is oppressive, unhealthful, and socially undesirable. Why then, should we open the possibility
for extensions of power by Congress to supervise and direct closely
all activities of the youth of our land? Briefly, these are the reasons
why the proposed Amendment has been so vigorously opposed, so
that after a thirteen-year struggle, and after a personal appeal from
the President, there still seems no near probability for the ratification
of the proposed Child Labor Amendment.
And now for our last and perhaps most important question. In the
light of recent Congressional legislation, and still more recent Congressional interpretations, is such an amendment still necessary to accomplish the desired purpose? In attempting to answer this vital question we will use as a basis a very recent decision of the United States
Supreme Court in thL case of the Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v. Illinois Central R. Co. 8 This case related to the constitutional validity of
the Act of Congress of July 24, 1935, known as the "Ashurst-Sumners Act." 9 The court said: "The Act makes it unlawful knowingly to
transport in interstate or foreign commerce goods made by convict
labor into any state where the goods are intended to be received, possessed, sold, or used in violation of its laws." Here was an attempt by
Congress to regulate in interstate commerce certain products merely
because they were produced by a particular class of labor. What difference would it make if it were convict labor or child labor? The
Court here, in spite of its decision in the Hammer case, concluded that
the Ashurst-Sumners Act was constitutional, basing its decision on the
fact "that where the subject of commerce is one as to which the
power of the state may constitutionally be exerted by restriction or
prohibition in order to prevent harmful consequences, the Congress
may, if it sees fit, put forth its power to regulate interstate commerce
so as to prevent that commerce from being used to impede the carrying out of the state policy."
It may be pointed out that the decision in the Hammer case was
aimed at a law which absolutely prohibited the products of child labor
in interstate commerce, while the AcL in question in the convict labor
case prohibited the transportation of convict-made goods into states
where they were intended to be received, possessed, sold, or used in
violation of the state laws. However, in both instances Congress was
exercising regulation in interstate commerce of products, not in them8 299 U. S. 334 (1937).
9

49 STAT. 494.
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selves harmful, but only because they were manufactured by a particular class of laborers, in the Hammer case by child labor, and in
Ashurst-Sumners Act by convict labor. Fundamentally, there was the
same type of problem in each case; and they surely do not seem to be
reconcilable. This argument was raised in the Kentucky Whip & Collar
case, and the court disposed of it very unsatisfactorily by merely saying: "The ruling in Hammer v. Dagenhart, upon which petitioner relies, in no way contravenes or limits the principle of this decision. In
the Hammer case the Court concluded that the act of Congress there
under consideration had as its aim the placing of local production under
Federal control." Why the Hammer case does not contravene or limit
the principle of the later decision the court does not point out, but very
tactfully evades--perhaps they themselves did not know.
In conclusion, therefore, we are faced with this situation. There is
present in our country an evil which all agree should cease, namely,
child labor. In 1918 the United States Supreme Court held, in the
Hammer case, that Congress could not relieve this. Then Congress presented for ratification an amendment to the United States Constitution which would give it the power to correct the evil, but the proposal
was far too general in -its aspects, so that it is unlikely, even with recent
suggested amendments to the amendment, that a sufficient number of
states will ratify the proposed Amendment at any reasonably early
time. But now comes a decision of the Supreme Court in 1937 (the
Kentucky Whip & Collar case), which declares that Congress has the
right to regulate in interstate commerce goods -made by a particular
class of laborers when those goods are to be received, possessed, sold, or
used in violation of the state laws. There seems to b& a new field
opened for the foes of child labor. Why could not Congress pass an
act making it unlawful knowingly to transport in interstate or foreign
commerce goods made by child labor into any statt where the goods
are intended to be received, possessed, sold, or used in violation of
state laws? Under the ruling of the convict labor case such a law
would probably be upheld by the Supreme Court. Many states already
have child labor restrictions, and surely all twenty-eight states which
have already ratified the Amendment would be favorable to such
child labor restrictions. Surely the manufacturers who now employ
child labor would rather conform to the minimum age requirements
of the states rather than lose their markets altogether. Of course, there
might be some difficulty in obtaining uniform state child labor restrictions; but this mere question of detail would no doubt reach an early
satisfactory solution. Such a method of attack offers the possibility of
quick action, and this too is important when we consider the years of
struggling over the proposed Amendment. Such a bill was passed by
the United States Senate on August 16, 1937; it is the Wheeler-Johnson
Bill (S. 2226). If this Bill is -passed by Congress, it will probably be
the solution to the long and bitter controversy over the child labor
Joseph B. Shapero.
problem.
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CONTEMPT-VIOLATION OF A COURT ORDER BY REPORTERS AND
PHOTOGRAPHERS-COMMENT ON PENDING CASES AND DECIDED CASES.

-Holding one for contempt of court when the alleged contempt has
been a publication in a newspaper has been, criticized because it is said
to interfere with the guaranty of freedom of speech or of the press, as
provided for in the First Amendment to the Federal Constitution.' This
freedom of the press, however, does not mean the liberty or license, "or
the unrestricted right to do and say what one pleases at all times and
under all circumstances." 2 A few of the limitations upon this freedom
are things which adversely affect the promotion of justice,3 obscene
matters, 4 advocation of revolt against the gqvernment, 5 which includes
such things as seditious utterances,6 syndicalism, 7 and sabotage. 8 Many
of the states have statutes prohibiting such things as these, and Kansas has a statute in which all unlawful teachings, writings and unlawful publications are made a felony and punishable by fine and imprisonment. 9 Other things besides these statutory limitations limit the
press, such as the printing of libelous matter,10 invasions of the right
of privacy," contempt, 12 and blasphemy.' 3 From these limitations we
can see that the freedom of the press is apparently but a group of
privileges hemmed in by many limitations on their use.
The newspapers of today are our most widespread method of communicating to the masses of the people the news of the day. Because
of this, the freedom of speech and press are most frequently associated
with them. The purpose of this Note is to show what they can and what
they cannot do in relation to contempt of court.
Newspaper contempt may be divided into two main classes: (1) Direct contempt, such as the violation of a court order and anything done
in the presence of the court; and (2) Indirect contempt (by publication). Under the second class a recent case 14 has further divided contempt into three classes: (1) Publications which tend to scandalize the
court; (2) Publications concerning pending cases, which tend to influence the court, advise disobedience, or take a violent partisan stand,

I

U. S. CONST. Amend. I.
2 Warren v. United States, 183 Fed. 718 (C. C. A. 8th, 1910).
3 Warren v. United States, op. cit. supra note 2.
4 Im. REv. STAT. (1937) c. 38, § 468.

5 l_.. Rlv. STAT. (1937) c. 38, § 559.

6

Masses Publishing Co. v. Patton, 246 Fed. 24 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1918).

7 KA. GFN. STAT. (1935) § 21-301.
8 KAx. GEN. STAT. (1935) § 21-302.
9 KA. Gm. STAT. (1935) § 21-303.
10 May v. Syracuse Newspapers, Inc., 294 N. Y. S. 867 (1937).
11 Binns v. Vitagraph Co. of America, 210 N. Y. S. 51, 103 N. E. 1108

(1913).
12 In re Independent Pub. Co., 228 Fed. 787 (D. C. D. Mont. 1915).
13 R. W. Lee, The Law of Blasphemy, 16 MICH. L. REv. 149, 152.
14 State v. American News Co., 266 N. W. 827 (S. D. 1936).
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or which by their nature, tend to impede the administration of justice and which make it necessary to dismiss the jury; and (3) False,
inaccurate or garbled reports of the proceedings.
Under the first class the general rule is that the court may protect
itself by orders restraining publication or preventing the reporters from
discussing the trial of a case. There are many times when proceedings
in a cause should not be published, even though accurate, while the
case is pending. In that case the court can make a special rule forbidding or limiting the publication, and a violation of this will be contempt; 15 the court can make all rules to protect itself, and this includes the power to prevent publication of any article the court sees
fit to prevent, such as evidence and other matters while the case is
pending. An example of this power is illustrated in a Maryland case, 16
where a reporter and camera-man were held in contempt for taking
photographs in a court-room after the court had made an order forbidding the taking of pictures in the court-room. But this power shodl
rarely be exercised and only to promote the ends of justice, the mode of
preventing the publication being left largely in the discretion of the
trial judge. "It is in its nature and manner of its exercise without the
possibility of control by a supervising court." This is generally ac7
complished by suspending publication until the trial is complete.' It
is also further regulated by the power of the court to regulate the admission of persons to the court-room; so the court can exclude anyone
who comes into court to report the testimony during the trial.18 The
court may also enjoin any publication that would be prejudicial to the
case,19 though the courts will .be slow to punish the press further than
censure them for commenting on the pending proceedings until previous warning has been given to abstain therefrom. 20 Though the court
has made an order forbidding access to some papers in the case if the
newspaper has obtained information from another source as to what
was in21the papers and has published the information there is no contempt.
The determination of contempt in the first class then is relatively
easy; but in the second class there is much difficulty and diversity of
opinion as to what constitutes contempt. Under the old common-law
rule' any publication "scandalizing the courts" was treated as contempt. In England and the minority of jurisdictions in this country it is
still so treated, but the modem tendency in this country is that it is
Stuart v. People, 3 Scam. (Ill.) 395 (1841).
16 Ex parte Sturm, 152 Md. 114, 136 AtI. 312 (1927).
17 State v. Galloway & Rhea, 45 Tenn. 326, 98 Am. Dec. 404 (1868).
18 United States v. Holmes, Fed. Cas. No. 15,383 (C. C. E. D. Pa. 1842).
19 Kitcat v. Sharp, 48 L. T. 64 (1882); Brook v. Evans, 2 L. T. 74 (1860).
20 Dunham v. The State of Iowa, 6 Iowa 245 (1858); Queen v. O'DaTgherty,
5 Cox C. C. 348.
21 In re Times Publishing Co., 267 N. W. 858 (Mich. 1936).
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not contempt but that the judge is left to his remedy of suing for
damages for libel. 22 The law in determining what is contempt in these
cases distinguishes between attacks on the judge and attacks on the
tribunal. The former may be libelous, and, if so, the remedy is by civil
action; the latter is contempt according to its purpose and effect, and
when so, the offender is subject to punishment. In our jurisprudence
the action of contempt of court does not lie to heal the wounded sensibilities of a judge; it may be invoked only when the offending act
23
impedes or disturbs the administration of justice.
A distinction must be made, though, between discussions of cases
that have been decided and discussions of those that are pending. In
upholding the old common-law rule as to publications "scandalizing the
courts," some of the courts have made no distinction between cases
that have been decided and those that were pending. In one case 2 4 the
court said that as long as the position of the court was correctly stated
and that its official integrity was unimpeached, then the newspapers
could print what they wished, but when the articles got beyond the
point of honest criticism then they were subject to liability for contempt. In a Wisconsin case 25 the court held that comment on previously decided cases was not contempt, and to punish it as such would
be an infringment of the constitutional guaranty of freedom of the
press. So then the general rule is that the judge is left to his remedy of
civil action where the comments are on previously decided cases; such
comments do not impede the administration of justice. When the case
is decided then the courts are subject to the same criticism as other
people. 26 In a recent New York case 27 it was held that comment on
the behavior of the court in cases that had been fully decided in the
particular court that was criticized is unrestricted under the constitutional guaranty of liberty of press and freedom of speech.
Neither does the criticism of the ministerial acts of the judge constitute a contempt. This is because the ministerial act does not come
within the purview of the word "proceeding," which is the regular and
28
usual mode of carrying on a suit by due course at the common-law.
Where a publication will impede the course of a trial or justice in
any way then it is clearly contempt. This brings us to the second class
of cases under contempt, that is, contempt by publication. In this type
of cases it does not matter that the court or jury did not see the publication, or even that any actual obstruction be established; the test
22
23
24
25

State v. Sweetland, 3 S. D. 503, 54 N. W. 415 (1893).
Francis v. People of Virgin Islands, 11 Fed. (2d) 860 (C. C. A. 3d, 1926).
People v. Wilson, 64 III. 195 (1892).
State v. Circuit Court, 97 Wis. 1, 72 N. W. 193 (1897).

27

Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U. S. 454, 463 (1906).
Supreme Court v. Albertson, 275 N. Y. S. 361 (1934).

28

Statter v. United States, 66 Fed. (2d) 819 (C. C. A. 9th, 1933).
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is whether the publication tends to obstruct justice.2 9 Neither does
the alleged contempt have to actually obstruct justice or bring the court
into disrepute; all that is necessary is that the publication be of a
character calculated to produce such an effect. 30 In the Federal courts,
before the passage of the Act of March 2, 1831,81 the courts had the
power to punish all contempts of authority, and this was in the discretion of the court. So any publication 32 criticizing the decision of the
judge, or reflecting on the parties to the suit, was a contempt. The Act
of March 2, 1831, however, limited this authority of the courts until
today the generally accepted view is that the publication must tend
to obstruct justice 33 or the administration of the law. The comment
on judicial proceedings must be argued from truthful and not false
premises. This is illustrated in the case of Francis v. People of Virgin
Islands,3 4 where the publication complained of the writer's trial and
conviction without a jury, it was held to be contempt as calculated to
prejudice the court in the public eye and mind.
Two old cases illustrate the old common-law rule as to this point,
one where the defendant was held in contempt because he had published an article vilifying the plaintiff and asserting that the jury had
given an infamous verdict. In the modem rule the plaintiff would have
been left to his action for libel if published after the trial was finished
and if published during the trial it would have been contempt by having the effect of impeding justice.3 5 In another the defendant was held
in contempt because he imputed fraud and ill faith to directors of a
company who was party to a trial.3 6 There the effect was also to prejudice the directors in the eyes of mankind and create prejudice against
them.
The place of the publicatica is not controlling either; it is the place
where the effect of the publication is felt. The intent to publish the
article is all that is necessary because the publisher knows that the
trial is going on and one of the jurors would probably read it and its
probable consequence would be to impede justice. 37
A few of the things that have been held to be contempt are such
things as a publication made before the trial consisting of evidence
which made it difficult to select a jury that would be impartial,38 a
publication charging that one sitting as a grand juror was incompe29 United States v. Toledo News Co., 247 U. S. 402 (1918).
30 Kilgallen v. State, 192 Ind. 531, 132 N. E. 683, 137 N. E. 178 (1922).
81U. S. C. A. Tit. 28, § 385.
32 Hollingsworth v. Duane, Fed. Cas. No. 6,616 (C. C. D. Pa. 1801).
33 United States v. Toledo News Co., 220 Fed. 458 (D. C. N. D. Ohio 1918).
84 OP. cit. supra note 23.
85 United States v. Duane, Fed. Cas. No. 14, 997 (C. C. D. Pa. 1801).
30 In re Cheltenham & Swansea, L. R. 8 Eq. 58 (1869).
37 In re Independent Publishing Co., 228 Fed. 787 (D. C. D. Mont. 1915).
38 Globe Newspaper v. Commonwealth, 188 Mass. 449, 74 N. E. 682 (1905).
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tent, 9 a publication consisting of things that would not be admissible
at the trial, 40 and where the defendant in contempt proceedings sent
a letter to the -prosecuting attorney advising him that the trial judge
was prejudiced and biased. 41 It must be noticed, though, that the last
illustration is one where the case was pending, because if it had been
decided the judge would be left to his remedy by civil action for libel.
In a South Dakota case 42 the defendant had written an article in the
newspaper commenting on the fact that the prisoner and the jury and
the judge were members of same political faiths thus said to indirectly
show bias. This was held not to be a contempt because nowhere did it
appear that the article would prejudice the cause. Only such publications as are caliculated to influence, intimidate, impede, embarrass, or
obstruct the courts in the due administration of justice in matters
pending before them are contempt.
Now we come to the third class - that of false, inaccurate or garbled
reports of judicial proceedings. The right to publish reports of judicial
proceedings is conditionally privileged and the reports must conform
to certain rules. It must he strictly confined to judicial proceedings; the
report must be fair and accurate; it must have been made in good
faith, that is, it must be free from malice in the sense of malice in fact;
it must be a report as distinguished from comment. It is not necessary
that the entire proceedings be published word for word as they transpired, 'but what is necessary to make the report privileged is that the
report must be sufficiently full so that no erroneous or false impressions
be created, and that it be fair and accurate. As shown before, a court
proceeding is the usual and regular mode of carrying on a suit at common law. So any proceeding that is not a judicial proceeding is not
privileged, such as the finding of a secret indictment by a grand jury.
Judicial proceedings are to be distinguished from reports of legislatures,
councils and committees.
However privileged a report may be, when there is a mistake in it
and an erroneous impression is created there is liability even though
the publisher has made a reasonable effort to ascertain the facts, as
where the publication has made a mistake in the names of the persons
that have been charged by an indictment of the grand jury.4 3 At all
times the publisher holds himself out to be equipped to undertake the
work of publication and it is undertaken at his peril. "It is the right
of a newspaper, as of any private citizen, in public or in private, to
discuss the opinions of the court, to criticize their reasoning, or to
39
40

Matter of Van Hook, 3 City Hall Rec. (N. Y.) 64, 13 C. J. 38, n. 29.
Herald-Republican Publishing Co. v. Lewis, 42 Utah 188, 129 Pac. 642

(1913).
Froelich v. United States,,33 Fed. (2d) 660 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929).
State v. Edwards, 15 S. D. 383, 89 N. W. 1011 (1902).
48 Sweet v. Post Publishing Co., 215 Mass. 450, 120 N. E. 660 (1913).
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question by scxber argument the soundness of their conclusions, but not
to misstate these conclusions." 44
Report must :be distinguished from comment. That which is privileged is an account of what transpired in a case as distinguished from
comment thereon and inferences drawn therefrom. In one case the
plaintiff brought an action for libel; the proceedings in the case had
been told truthfully and all facts had been categorically stated, but
each statement of fact was accompanied by a comment, inference, or
insinuation directly tending to throw ridicule on the plaintiff and deprecate his character. The court said: "To a fair and true publication
of his case the litigant must submit, but this principle does not give the
right to prejudice a case, misstate it, or hold up to scorn or ridicule,
either directly or indirectly or by natural implication from the language,
a party who is pursuing his legal remedies in court." 45
William Langley.

SURETYSIP-PLEDGING PROPERTY AS SECURITY FOR THE DEBT OF
ANOTHER-An interesting phase of the law of suretyship that is seldom
recognized is the similarities and differences between the ordinary suretyship contract and the contract whereby one pledges 'his property as
security for the debt of another. Generally in the ordinary suretyship
contract one becomes personally liable for the debt or legal obligation
of another, depending, of course, upon the terms of the contract. However, when one pledges his property as security for the debt of another,
it is generally true that the property so pledged is bound for the payment of the debt, but the pledgor is not necessarily personally bound.
This, too, depends upon the terms of the contract entered into.
With regard to the pledging of property as security for the debt of
another it is interesting to note that the courts are at variance as to
Who or what is the surety. Some of the courts hold that the property
pledged is the surety,1 while others say that the pledgor of the property is the surety. 2 An example of the former is In re Blanckard s in
which case stock was pledged as security for -the same debt as that
44

In re Providence Journal Co., 28 R. 1. 489, 68 Atl. 428 (1907).

45

Brown v. Providence Tel. Pub. Co., 25 R. I. 117, 54 Atl. 1061 (1903).

1 In re Blanchard, 253 Fed. 758 (D. N. J. 1918); Price v. Reed, 124 Ill. 317,
15 N. E. 754 (1888); Hinton v. Greenleaf, 113 N. C. 6, 18 S. E. 56 (1893);
Note, 15 N. C. L. RPv. 209.
2 Cross v. Allen, 141 U. S. 528 (1891); Eberhart v. Eyre-Shoemaker, Inc.,
70 Ind. App. 658, 134 N. E. 227 (1922); Matthews v. Matthews, 128 Me. 495,
148 AUt. 796 (1930); Knight v. Whitehead, 26 Miss. 245 (1853); Stevens v. First
National Bank of Muskogee, 117 Okla. 148, 245 Pac. 567 (1926).
a 253 Fed. 758 (D. N. 3. 1918).
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ifor which the sons of the owner of the stock became surety, and at
the same time. It was held that the stock and the sons were cosureties,
and as such required to bear a proportionate share of the loss.
In Fowler v. Barlow 4 the statement is made that "one who pledges
or mortgages his property to secure the debt of another, without becoming personally bound for the payment, is, as to that debt, a surety....
It is sometimes said that, in such a situation, it - the property pledged
or mortgaged that stands in the position of a surety." However,
whether it is the pledgor or mortgagor, or the property pledged or
mortgaged that is recognized as the surety, it is held that anything
that would release a personal surety will release and discharge the
surety where property is pledged. 5
Apparently this distinction as to who or what is considered to be
the surety is of little consequence. It is not controlling as to the extent
of liability because this depends upon the terms of the suretyship contract, which is generally strictissimi juris, especially in the case of an
accommodation surety. Some courts -hold, however, that the surety's
promise is to be construed just as any other contract is construed.6
Neither is the distinction material, in the majority of the states, with
regard to the statute of limitations, a matter upon which it might
conceivably have some bearing. In Corpus Juris 7 it is said: "In the
greater number of jurisdictions if the statute of limitations has not
barred the remedy on a mortgage or deed for security, such remedy
hmay be enforced, although action on the debt secured or the evidence
thereof is barred. . .

."

As the statute of limitations does not start

running in favor of the mortgagor until the time the mortgagee's right
of action accrues, that is, from the time the condition of the mortgage
is broken,8 the mortgagee has the statutory period, dating from that
timej in which to foreclose the mortgage, regardless of whether the
property or the mortgagor is considered the surety.
Generally, it makes no difference whether it is property or personal
liability that is pledged for the debt of another, so far as the rights
of the surety are concerned.9 However, the Negotiable Instruments
Law has created some exceptions to this general statement. In the
majority of the states that have passed upon the matter it has been held
that under the Negotiable Instruments Law an accommodation maker
4
5

102 Vt. 99, 146 Atl. 77 (1929).
Hinton v. Greenleaf, 113 N. C. 6, 18 S. E. 56

U. S. 528 (1891); Stevens v. First
245 Pac. 567 (1926).
6 ARANT ON SuRxrYsHn' § 39.
7

(1893);

Cross v. Allen, 141

National Bank of Muskogee,

117

37 C. J. 703.
2 JONES ON MORTGAGES

Okla.

148,

(8th ed.) § 1550.
9 Gahn v. Niemcewicz's Executors, 11 Wend. 312 (1833); Hinton v. Greenleaf, 113 N. C. 6, 18 S. E. 56 (1893); Cross v. Allen, 141 U. S. 528 (1891);
8

Stevens v. First National Bank, 117 Okla. 148, 245 Pac. 567 (1926).
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or surety on a negotiable instrument is not discharged from liability
thereon 1by a binding extension of time granted to the principal maker
without the consent of the surety or accommodation maker.10 Thus,
in Cellers v. Meackem 11 it was held that under the Negotiable Instruments Law an accommodation maker of a promissory note who
signs the note as a co-maker thereof is primarily liable thereon even
t.ough he places the word "surety" after his name, and even though
the payee and holder of the note knows the true relation between the
parties. It was said that since such an accommodation maker is primarily liable on the note he is not discharged or relieved from liability
by a binding extension of time of payment by his co-maker without
his consent.
The theory of the cases is that the surety or accommodation maker
is primarily liable. 12 Being primarily liable he is discharged only by
the methods provided in the act for a discharge of the instrument itself.' 3 'ince an extension of time is not one of the methods provided
for a discharge of the instrument, it follows that a surety or accommodation maker is not thus discharged.
Again, a material alteration of the original agreement or instrument
of indebtedness without the consent of the surety generally discharges
the surety.' 4 Where, however, the instrument is a negotiable instrument and is in the hands of a holder in due course the accommodation
maker or surety remains liable according to the original tenor of the
note.15
It has also been held that where, a mortgage is given as collateral, a
material alteration of the instrument of indebtedness without fraudulent intent will not avoid the mortgage which will still remain a valid
security for the original consideration.'i
Another situation in which there is a difference, in some states at
least, between the two kinds of suretyship contracts arises from the
husband and wife relationship. In Goll v. Fehr 1 7 a married woman
joined with her husband in executing a note secured by a mortgage on
her separate property as collateral to the husband's indebtedness to a
bank. It was held that the mortgage was enforceable in equity to the
10 Cellers v. Meachem, 49 Ore. 186, 89 Pac. 426 (1907); Union Trust Co. v.
McGinty, 212 Mass. 205, 98 N. E. 679 (1912); Richards v. Market Exch. Bank
Co., 81 Ohio St. 348, 90 N. E. 1000 (1910).
11 49 Ore. 186, 89 Pac. 426 (1907).
12 NGOTIABLE INSRUMENTS LAw §§ 29, 192.
18 N OTiABLE INsRUME NTs LAW § 119.
14 ARANT ON SuRunzs=i § 67.
'5
NEoTiABLE INSTRUwmTs LAW § 124; Thorpe v. White, 188 Mass. 333,
74 N. E. 592 (1905); Packard v. Windholz, 84 N. Y. S. 666 (1903); Wash.
Finance Corp. v. Glass, 74 Wash. 653, 134 Pac. 480 (1913).
18 Fowler v. Barlow, 102 Vt. 99, 146 AtL. 77 (1929).
17 131 Wis. 141, 111 N. W. 235 (1907).
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extent of the value of the property so charged, though the wife was not
personally liable on the 6ollateral note.
As has been said, however, whether it is a personal surety or a
property surety the law with regard to liability, notice, discharge, etc.,
is substantially the same. For example, what will operate to discharge
one surety will do likewise to the other. Thus, a binding agreement for
the extension of the time of payment of the principal debt without
the consent of the accommodation mortgagor discharges the property
mortgaged. 18 The same is true generally where collateral of any kind
is given to secure the debt of another,19 subject, of course, to the exceptions, already noted, created by the Negotiable Instruments Law.
Rex E. Weaver.

TAXATION-IMMUNITY

OF STATE AGENCIES AND EMPLOYEES FROM

FEDERAL INCOME TAx.-As early as 1819, in McClloch v. Maryland,'
the United States Supreme Court held that a state had no power to pass
a law imposing a tax upon the operations of a national bank. The result
of this decision has been a general doctrine that a state has no power
to tax the agencies and instrumentalities of the Federal Government.
The immunity of national property from state taxation is founded upon
the decision in the McCulloch case.2 In accordance with the doctrine
of this case, it has been held that a state tax imposed upon the salaries
or compensation of a postal clerk, a regional attorney for the United
States Veterans Administration, and a stockman upon an Indian Reservation is invalid, on the theory that if these employees of the Federal
Government are not, in a limited sense, governmental agencies op instrumentalities, they are necessary parts of such, and their income from
the Federal Government for such services cannot be taxed by the state. 3
The converse of the foregoing doctrine is true, also. State instrumentalities and agencies have similarly been protected from federal taxation. In 1871 the United States Supreme Court held, in Buffington v.
Day (The Collector v. Day),4 that Congress was not entitled, under
the Federal Constitution, to impose a tax upon the salary of a judicial
officer of a state. In this case Justice Nelson admitted that there is no
express provision in the Federal Constitution that prohibits the Federal
18 Hinton v. Greenleaf, 113 N. C. 6, 18 S. E. 56 (1893).
19 Eberhart v. Eyre-Shoemaker, Inc., 70 Ind. App. 658, 134 N. E. 227 (1922);
Van Hoesen v. Gelfpu, 103 N. J. Eq. 234, 143 Atl. 137 (1928).
1 4 Wheat. 316 (1819).
2 See South Carolina v. United Stetes, 119 U. S. 437 (1905). See 11 T-,iPLE

L. Q. 383.
8
4

Schlosser v. Welsh, 5 F. Supp. 993 (D. S. D. 1934).
11 Wall. 113 (1871). See: 37 CoL. L. REv. 1019; 12 IND. L.
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Government from taxing state agencies and instrumentalities, and that
there was no express provision in the Federal Constitution prohibiting
a state from taxing federal agencies and instrumentalities. He said that
in both cases the exemption rests upon necessary implication, the implication being that, since the power to tax involves the power to destroy, the law of self-preservation upholds the exemption in each instance. The late Justice Holmes emphatically asserted that the power
to tax is not the power to destroy. 5 Taxation, however, if not restrained
by reasonable limits, would probably lead to destruction of government.
If the exemption is founded on the reason that the power to tax is the
power to destroy, then the exemption itself might seriously impair the
functioning of the governments of the various states. The Federal
Government has recently entered many fields of endeavor formerly
engaged in by private enterprise, and the property used therein, which
is exempt from state taxation, causes millions of dollars to be withdrawn from state taxation. 6 A survey of the Federal governmental
agencies and enterprises shows the following: 7 (1) Electricity and
water power, either existing or proposed (Arkansas Valley Authority,
Arkansas River, Bonneville Dam, Boulder Canon Project, Casper-Alcova Dam, Electric Homeand Farm Authority, Fort Peck Dam, Grand
Coulee Dam, Missouri and Mississippi Valley Authority, and the Tennessee Valley Authority); (2) Housing (Federal Home Loan Banks,
Federal Housing Administration, Federal Savings and Loan Insurance
Corporation, Federal Subsistence Homestead Corporation, Home Owners' Loan Corporation, and Public Works Emergency Housing Corporation); (3) Agriculture (Commodity Credit Corporation, Federal Farm
Mortgage Corporation, Federal Surplus Relief Corporation, and Production Credit Corporation); and (4) Finance (Emergency Public
Works and Construction Projects, Export-Import Banks of Washington, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and Reconstruction Finance Corporation). The franchises, capital stock, and securities of
the corporations created in connection with these agencies and instrumentalities are exempt from taxation, as well as any income derived
therefrom. 8 Also, these agencies and instrumentalities are more or less
competing with heavily taxed private industries.
On the other hand, a number of recent decisions will show the extent
to which the courts have gone in holding state officials exempt from
the Federal Income Tax. The income of the Chief Engineer of the
Bureau of Water Supply of the City of New York was held exempt
from the Federal Income Tax, on the ground that the acquisition and
distribution by a city of the supply of water is a governmental function,
5
6
7

Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 277 U. S. 218, 223 (1928).
11 TM ' L. Q. 383, 384.

11 TEMLE L. Q. 383, 384.
8 11 TE ,L. L. Q. 383, 384.
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and, as a necessary corollary, the salaries paid in connection with the
rendition of this service are likewise exempt. 9 The wages of an emVloyee of a street railway owned and operated by a municipality have
been held exempt from the Federal Income Tax.10 The compensation
of a manager of a cafeteria operated by a school district has been held
exempt from federal taxation on the theory that such taxation would
be an interference with a state governmental function." The salary of
a state bank liquidator has been held not subject to federal taxation
on the ground that he was an instrumentality of the state in aiding it
in the administration of its banking laws.' 2 These few decisions indicate the trend in the matter of exemption of state employees from
federal taxation. In view of the fact that approximately 5,000,000 13
state employees are exempt from federal taxation, the importance of
this problem can very well be realized 'by those taxpayers who are not
employed by a state or a municipality.
The immunity does not exist, however, unless the federal tax imposes a real burden upon, or constitutes an impediment to, the normal
exercise by the state of its sovereign power.' 4 Accordingly, the salary
of an attorney employed by the state of New York as a liquidating
agent in the Bureau of the State Insurance Department was held not
exempt from federal taxation, since the federal tax did not impose a
burden on the exercise of state sovereignty.' 5 Where the state has
departed from its usual governmental function and engaged in a business enterprise for the public benefit,' 6 and where persons subjected
to the federal taxation are neither officers of nor regular employees of
the state, but are so-called independent contractors, the federal tax
does not impose a burden upon the normal exercise by the state of its
7
sovereign powers.'
The cases do not establish any precise formula by which we can
determine with precision and in advance the difference between the
Brush v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 57 S. Ct. 495 (1937).
Frey v. Woodworth, 2 Fed. (2d) 725 (D. C. Mich. 1924),
rit of error
dismissed, 270 U. S. 669.
"1 Hoskins v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 84 Fed. (2d) 627 (C. C.
A. 5th, 1936).
12 Therrel v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 88 Fed. (2d) 869 (C. C. A.
$-th, 1937).
18 N. Y. Times, March 21, 1937, p. 2, col. 5.
14 McLoughlin v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 89 Fed. (2d) 699 (C.
C. A. 2nd, 1937).
15 McLoughlin v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, op. cit. supra note 14.
16 South Carolina v. United States, op. cit. supra note 2; State of Ohio v.
Helvering, 292 U. S. 360 (1933).
17 Metcalf v. Mitchell, 269 U. S. 514 (1925).
9
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governmental and proprietary functions of a state. The United States
Supreme Court refuses to be bound by any local rule governing with
respect to municipal liability in tort.1 8 In that' field no definite rule
can be extracted from the cases. The line of distinction is shadowy
and difficult to draw in many instances.
George E. Murphy.

TAXATIoN-THE "USE" TAx.-To support an expanding bureaucracy various methods of taxation are necessarily employed. Among
them appears a novelty, a "use" tax. Generally utilized as a correlative of the much criticized sales tax, it hias been adopted in California,
Oklahoma, and Washington in 1935, Ohio and North Carolina in 1936,
and in Michigan during the recent meeting of its legislators. To curb
legal escapes from payment of sales taxes through out-of-state purchases by large consumers, legislators have slapped a tax upon the consumption of goods within the state. The tax, being the same rate as
the sales tax, is not levied upon goods bought in the state-the statute,
to avoid double taxation, exempting such goods-but is aimed primarily at interstate commerce. Several questions at once arise. Is this tax
constitutional? Is it a burden upon interstate commerce? Is it discriminatory?
To understand intelligibly the problems faced and conclusions
reached 'by the courts passing upon the "use" tax statute, a history of
Supreme Court decisions demonstrating the development of state taxing
power is essential. Brown v. The State of Maryland1 was the first to
deal with the problem. The state of Maryland enacted a statute compelling all importers of foreign articles, commodities, etc., as a condition precedent to selling, to procure a 'license. The appellant attacked
the Act as a violation of the constitutional clause prohibiting any state
from "levying any imposts or duty upon imports or exports, except
what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws."
Chief Justice Marshall, in his opinion, invoked principles which control
foreign commerce to this day, the most frequent and best known being
the "original package" doctrine. The Supreme Court held that no state
has the power, either directly or indirectly, to tax or burden foreign
imports as long as they remain in the bands of the importer in their
original packages; 2 that it can tax only after the importer has so acted
Brush v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, op. dt. supra note 9.
12 Wheat. 419 (1827).
2 "Original package," from the composite definition of several courts, "means
that package, which, according to custom respecting the particular articles shipped,
is usually delivered by the vendor to the carrier for transportation, and delivered
as a unit to the consignee." Annotation, 26 A. L. R. 971.
18
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upon his imports that they no longer retain their character as such but
become incorporated and mixed up in the mass of property within the
country. But in concluding his opinion Chief Justice Marshall said:
"It may be proper to add, that we suppose the principles laid down in
this case, to apply equally to importations from a sister state. We do
not mean to give any opinion on a tax discriminating between foreign
and domestic articles." What was actually meant by these words is a
matter of conjecture. Did he intend to forbid the taxation of all interstate commerce? Or was he merely referring to foreign goods imported
from another state? The former is the more plausible; at least the
plaintiff argued it in Woodruff v. Parkam.3
In Woodruff v. Parkam4 the city (f Mobile, Alabama, placed a tax
on all goods sold at auction sales, sales of merchandise, real and personal property, capital employed in business and incomes. The plaintiff, engaged in selling goods at auctions, was willing to pay taxes upon
goods bought in Alabama but objected to taxes imposed upon articles
brought into the State and sold in their original packages. The Supreme Court, sustaining the action of the tax collector, based its decision on social justice, holding that since the term "imports," properly
applied, did not include interstate commerce, the State had the power
to tax. It dismissed Chief Justice Marshall's remarks as mere dicta.
The problem of interstate commerce was up for consideration for the
first time.
This distinction between imports and interstate commerce was affirmed in Brown v. Houston 5 in 1884. The plaintiff, seeking to restrain
the defendant tax collector from levying upon certain coal in Louisiana
for nonpayment of the general property tax, contended that the coal
was brought there from Pennsylvania, and was not subject to state
regulation. The court stated that the coal, having come to rest in
Louisiana, even though still in original packages, was a part of the
general mass of property. The mere fact that it was subsequently exported, although not intended to be exported at the time of taxation,
did not change its character or deprive the state of its power to tax.
The cburt said: "But certainly, where a general tax is laid on all property alike, it cannot be construed as a duty on exports when falling
upon goods not then intended for exportation, though they should happen to be exported afterwards."
Since the court ruled that the original package doctrine did not apply
to interstate commerce, and that the states have the power to tax, it
was faced with the dilemma presented -by Leisy v. Hardin6 and Lyng
8 75 U. S. 123 (1869).
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v. Michigan.7 In the former a Peoria company sued to recover liquor
confiscated by an Iowa officer acting under an Iowa statute forbidding
the sale of intoxicating liquors. The court held that to prohibit sale of
merchantable goods brought into one state from other states, as long as
they remained in the original packages, would be a regulation of interstate commerce; that only after the original package was broken and
the goods intermingled with the general mass of property within the
state could any form of regulation be applied. Similarly, the court in
latter case held that the state could not classify out-of-state manufacturers of liquors as wholesalers for the purposes of taxation, since, the
goods still remaining in original packages, they were subject to the
control of Congress and free from all state regulations.
Although Leisy v. Hardin and Lyng v. Michigan appeared to overrule Woodruff v. Parham and Brown v. Houston, the court has applied
the doctrine of the latter cases as authority in subsequent cases, notably, Emert v. Missouri8 and Kelley v. Rhoads.9 The former held
that a tax upon peddlers was valid, even though the goods sold were
manufactured out of state and sold in their original packages. Kelley
v. Rhoads cited Brown v. Houston as upholding the rule that goods
brought to a state of rest could be taxed, but distinguished the case
where the goods were in transit at all times.
Since the application of the "original package" doctrine baffled attorneys and lower court judges, the Supreme Court, in American Steel
& Wire Co. v. Speed 10 attempted to reconcile the apparently conflicting rulings of Leisy v. Hardin and Lyng v. Michigan on the one hand
and Woodruff v. Parkam and Brown v. Houston on the other. The
court distinguished an absolute, express constitutional prohibition upon
the states from an implied prohibition. In Brown v. The State of
Maryland the tax considered was expressly prohibited by the Constitution as it was a tax upon imports. The above four controversial cases
dealt with no absolute or positive inhibition against the exercise of the
taxing power. Woodruff v. Parham and Brown v. Houston determined
whether a particular exertion of the taxing power so operated upon
interstate commerce as to amount to a regulation thereof, in conflict
with the paramount authority conferred upon Congress. Brown v.
Maryland settled that where goods were imported from one state into
another they preserved their character as imports as long as they remained unsold in their original packages, and were, accordingly, not
subject to direct or indirect state taxation as long as they remained
unsold in the original package (in which they were imported). This
case fixed the period when interstate commerce terminated. In Leisy v.
7

135 U. S: 161 (1889).

8 156 U. S. 296 (1894).
9 188 U. S. 1 (1902).
10 192 U. S. 500 (1903).

NOTRE DAME LAWYER
Hardin and Lyng v. Michigan the goods had reached their destination
and the question was not the power of the state to tax them, but its
authority to treat the goods as not the subject of interstate commerce,
and to prohibit their introduction or sale. This was held to be a regulation, within the constitutional sense, and therefore void. Both cases
conceded that interstate commerce was terminated only after the sale
at the point of destination in the original package; they did not determine that interstate commerce was to be considered as having completely terminated at one time for the purposes of import taxation, and
at a different period for the purposes of interstate commerce. 1' These
"cases, therefore, did not decide that interstate commerce was to be
considered as having completely terminated at one time for the purposes
of import taxation, and at a different period for the purposes of interstate commerce. But both cases [Leisy v. Hardin and Lyng v. Mickigan], whilst conceding that interstate commerce was completely terminated only after the sale at the point of destination in the original
packages, were rested upon the nature and operation of the particular
exertion of state authority considered in the respective cases." 12
Having established the power of the state to tax the original packages of goods imported from other states, even though it may indirectly
burden interstate commerce, the court advanced forward in Gregg
Dyeing Co. v. Query,' 3 where it upheld a statute providing an excise
tax upon gasoline to be used for consumption within the state twentyfour hours after it is brought into the state and stored. This tax was
imposed only if the goods had not already been taxed under a different
statute, The South Carolina Supreme Court had interpreted the statute as complementary to the regular gasoline tax collected at all filling
stations; therefore, no discrimination existed against interstate commerce.
Developing further this taxing power of the state, the United
States Supreme Court upheld, in Nastville, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Wallace, 1 4 the right of the state to place a consumption or use tax upon the
storage of gasoline within the state, even though it may subsequently
be used for interstate commerce. The plaintiff, railroad company,
stored gas in Tennessee for use in trains operating in interstate.
The court reasoned that the storing of the gas destroyed its character as interstate commerce and also its immunity from state taxation.
This principle was upheld and extended in Edelman v. Boeing Air
Transport, Inc.,15 in which the respondent, operating an interstate air
line, imported gasoline into Wyoming for storage until further use in
its planes. The right of the state to tax the "use" of this gasoline,
11 See American Steel & Wire Co. v. Speed, op. cit. supra note 10, at 521, 522.
12 American Steel & Wire Co. v. Speed, op. cit. supra note 10, at 522.
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despite the fact that it was to be used in interstate commerce, was
upheld on the grounds that "use" is measured at the time of withdrawal from storage and not while it is combusted in the plane; thus
the "use" is completed entirely within the state. The Court in the
latter case, in commenting on the Wallace case, said: "As the exercise
of the powers taxed, the storage and withdrawal from storage of the
gasoline, was complete before interstate commerce began, it was held
that the burden of the tax was too indirect and remote from the function of interstate commerce, to transgress constitutional limitations."
Keeping this history and development of taxation in mind the position of the "use" tax is clearly sighted. Such "use" tax statutes are
constructed as complementary to the sales tax enactments. They provide, in effect, that all property used within the state, if it has not
already been taxed under the sales tax statute, shall be assessed a "use"
tax. What effect a failure to include this provision would have upon
the constitutionality is speculative. It might easily be held double
taxation on goods bought within the state. If it named only interstate
commerce it might be ruled discriminatory and therefore invalid.
To date two cases have dealt with this statute. Powell v. Maxwell 1 6
upheld the constitutionality of such a tax statute, providing a tax upon
automobiles used within the state. This North Carolina Statute required every person to remit the tax with his application for license
and certificate of title, but excepted persons furnishing a statement
from a dealer in North Carolina showing that the sales tax had been
paid. The court held this tax law not to 'be discriminatory.
While Southern Pacific Co. v. Corbett 17 is not authoritative, it
will be interesting-if it should go higher-to watch the final determination. 'the tax collector applied the California use tax to the
storage of equipment to be used in interstate commerce. The trial
court held that although the tax was proper upon goods brought into
the state for consumption, yet it should not be applied to goods intended for an interstate use. The court, contrary to the belief of the
writer, distinguished Nashville v. Wallace and Edelman v. Boeing Air
Transport for the reason that it was not contended or proved that the
gasoline was set aside or allocated for an interstate use. In the writer's
opinion such contention and proof were made, but the tax was upheld,
as resting upon the storage or withdrawal from storage, which enjoyed
the protection of the state, and not upon the lack of proof of interstate
use. It is doubtful whether the Supreme Court will accept that distinction upon review, but due to the growing liberality toward state
taxing powers, it-will in all probability reverse the decision and uphold
the state's power to tax storage of equipment as well as the "use" tax
in general.
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